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Abstract 
This paper considers the evolution of thinking about poverty since Rowntree's classic 
study ofpoverty in England at the turn of the last century. It highlights the progressive 
broadening ofthe definition and measurement ofpoverty, from command over market-purchased 
goods (income) to other dimensions ofliving standards such as longevity, literacy and 
healthiness, and , most recently, to concerns with risk and vulnerability, and powerlessness and 
lack ofvoice. The paper argues that while there is a correlation between these different 
dimensions, this broadening changes significantly our thinking about strategies to reduce 
poverty. A broader definition expands the set of policies that are relevant to the reduction of 
poverty. But the broadening also emphasizes that poverty reducing strategies must recognize the 
interactions among the policies--the impact of appropriately designed combinations will be 
greater than the sum of the individual parts. 
-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Eradicating, or at least reducing, poverty lies at the heart of development economics. 
While development seeks to benefit all members of society, the poor command our special 
attention. Any reasonable definition ofpoverty implies that significant numbers ofpeople are 
living in intolerable circumstances where starvation is a constant threat, sickness is a familiar 
companion, and oppression is a fact of life. In Alfred Marshall's words, "The study of the causes 
of poverty is the study of the causes of degradation of a large part ofmankind."l Improving the 
lives of the poor must be at the top of our agenda. 
What does development economics have to say about reducing poverty? And how has 
thinking evolved over the last quarter of a century? This paper explores these issues through the 
evidence and analysis available in the literature in general and through the World Bank's World 
Development Reports on poverty.2 These reports, drawing on evidence from around the world, 
summarize contemporary thinking on the subject and are therefore useful instruments for 
assessing progress in our understanding of the problem and our ability to solve it. 
The breadth ofthe topic requires some selectivity. We focus on two questions. How 
should poverty be defined and measured? And, what policies and strategies reduce poverty so 
defined? The questions are of course related - the definition of poverty drives the choice of 
­
policies. To organize the discussion, we take advantage of the fact that the definition ofpoverty 
has broadened over the last quarter of a century, and, as it has broadened, so the relevant set of 
I Marshall, A. "Principles of Economics", p3, eighth edition, 1925. 
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policies has expanded. Beginning with a focus on command over market-purchased goods 
(income), the definition ofpoverty has expanded to embrace other dimensions of living standards 
such as longevity, literacy, and healthiness. And, as we learn more about and from the poor, the 
concept has developed further to reflect a concern with vulnerability and risk, and with 
powerlessness· and lack of voice. Our review of the evolution of thinking about poverty leads us 
to two broad conclusions. 
First, broadening the definition ofpoverty does not change significantly who is counted 
as poor - at least not as far as aggregate measures are concerned. While this is a simplification, 
and we can find evidence to the contrary in the literature, it reflects the fact that the many aspects 
ofpoverty - income, health, political rights, and so on - are often closely correlated. While 
aggregate measures may be largely unaffected, the broader definitions allow a better 
characterization ofpoverty and the terrible hardships burdening the poor, and therefore increase 
our understanding ofpoverty and the poor. This deeper understanding will often be critical to 
the design and implementation of specific programs and projects to help people escape poverty. 
Second and related, broadening the definition ofpoverty changes significantly our 
thinking about strategies to reduce poverty. In part this is obvious. A broader definition 
naturally expands the set ofpolicies that are relevant to the reduction ofpoverty. As more 
aspects ofpoverty are recognized, so more policies become relevant to fighting poverty ­
moving beyond income to include health, for example, introduces a new set ofpolicy 
instruments. But, there is another, more subtle and important consequence. The various aspects 
ofpoverty interact in important ways, such that policies do more than simply add up - for 
-

example, improving health increases income-earning potential, increasing education leads to 
better health outcomes, providing safety nets allows the poor to take advantage ofhigh-return, 
2 World Development Reports, 1980 and 1990. A new report on poverty will be issued in 2000. 
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high-risk opportunities, and so on. Poverty-reducing strategies must recognize the interactions 
among policies - the impact of appropriately designed combinations will be greater than the sum 
of the individual parts. The interaction between the various dimensions of poverty is a theme 
that runs throughout this review. 
These two issues - definition and strategy - are explored in more depth in the following 
sections as we trace the historical evolution ofpoverty through its various manifestations. 
Section two looks at the definition ofpoverty as it emerged from the pioneering efforts of 
Rowntree at the tum of the century. His focus on income (or expenditure) led naturally to a 
strategy based on growth in national income. But growth in national income will only help the 
poor if they share in that growth. The key interaction then was the link between growth in 
national income and changes in inequality, and a fear that progress on one front (growth) would 
leao to setbacks on the other (inequality) with uncertain implications for the poor. 
Section three explores the incorporation in the 1980s of other dimensions of poverty ­
longevity, literacy, healthiness. This brought new policies into play but also revealed two new 
interactions. One was within the new set ofpolicies - healthier children perform better at 
school; better educated mothers have healthier families and so on. And the other was between 
progress in human development and increases in national income. From one perspective better 
health and education can be viewed as an investment in human capital that, like investment in 
physical capital, should yield a return in the form of increased income. From another perspective 
better health and education can be seen as improvements in the quality of life in their own right. 
Indeed, in this view growth in national income only has value to the extent that is leads to longer 
-

lives, better health, and greater literacy. Either way, there is an interaction between the two sets 
of outcomes. 
3 
In section four we incorporate the findings from the analysis of panel data and from a 
range ofparticipatory techniques that have recently come to the fore and which seek to elicit 
views about poverty from the poor themselves. This has led to today's concern with risk and 
vulnerability, powerlessness, and lack of voice. Here too important interactions emerge. 
Reducing exposure to risk offers an immediate benefit to the otherwise vulnerable but it also 
provides a platform to escape long-run poverty -lower exposure to risk frees the poor to engage 
in riskier, but more profitable, production and investment strategies including investing in their 
children's education. Similarly, giving the poor voice reduces their sense of isolation, an 
immediate benefit. But once they have a greater say in the selection and design ofprograms to 
assist them, then they are also more committed to implementation. In direct opposition to the 
isolation the poor often endure, successful implementation of income-earning projects, health 
programs, and safety nets calls for inclusion and active participation in a wide range of 
circumstances. 
We conclude in section five by restating the central proposition of this review. As the 
definition ofpoverty has expanded and new dimensions have been introduced, the degree of 
interaction among the elements has also increased because each element contributes to well­
being in the broad but also contributes to the achievement of other elements. With this 
perspective as background, section five offers some views on the most important outstanding 
issues in need of further research. 
• 
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II. INCOME AND CONSUMPTION 
Conventional Measures 
According to normal usage poverty is "The state of one who lacks a usual or socially 
acceptable amount ofmoney or material possessions."] This definition contains two important 
ideas. First, the definition ofpoverty will be different at different times and in different societies 
- what is "socially acceptable" in, say, India may differ from that in the U.S.A. And second, the 
focus is on the ability to purchase goods and services (money) or on their ownership (material 
possessions). As we shall see, many attempts to measure poverty incorporate these two ideas. 
Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree, an early measurer ofpoverty, arrived at a "socially 
acceptable" amount ofmoney by estimating the budget required "to obtain the minimum 
necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency,,4 appropriate to the specific 
circumstances of the City of York at the tum of the century. Based on the nutritional content of 
various foods and their local prices, Rowntree concluded that fifteen shillings would provide the 
minimum budget for food for a family of six for one week. Adding an allowance for shelter, 
clothing, fuel, and other sundries, he arrived at a poverty line of twenty-six shillings for a family 
of six that implied a poverty rate ofalmost 10 percent in York. While this same approach has 
been used in other countries and other times, the resulting poverty line is sensitive to local 
circumstances. 
Thus, the Indian and U.S. poverty lines are based more or less on this approach, yet when 
both are expressed in 1985 PPP dollars, the latter is ten to twenty times as large as the former, 
depending on the size of the household. This difference reflects the tendency for poverty lines to 
-

change over time within countries as average incomes rise and views about the "minimum 
necessaries" evolve. A study ofpoverty lines - budgets for "minimum subsistence" - used in the 
3 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1995). 
5 
U.S.A. in the period 1905 to 1960 found that they rose 0.75 percent in real terms for each 1.0 
percent increase in the real disposable income per capita of the general population.s Thus, 
compared with the absolute poverty threshold established by Mollie Orshansky for 1963, 
minimum subsistence budgets before World War I were, in constant dollars, between 43 and 54 
percent as large; by 1923, a "minimum subsistence level" was 53 to 68 percent as large. An 
"emergency" budget during the Depression year of 1935 was 65 percent, and a low-income line 
for 1957 was 88 percent of Orshansky's threshold. 
That popular conceptions of the amount needed to "get along" rise with increases in 
overall incomes is neatly captured in a quotation from 1938: "A standard budget worked out in 
the [1890's], for example, would have no place for electric appliances, automobiles, spinach, 
radios, and many other things which found a place on the 1938 comfort model. The budget of 
1950 will undoubtedly make the present one look as antiquated as the hobble skirt.,,6 As 
technology progresses and the general standard of living rises, three effects have an impact on 
poverty: new consumption items, initially viewed as luxuries, come to be seen as conveniences 
and then as necessities; changes in the way society is organized may make it more expensive for 
the poor to accomplish a given goal- say, when widespread automobile ownership leads to a 
deterioration in public transportation; and finally, general upgrading of social standards can 
make things more expensive for the poor, as when housing code requirements that all houses 
have indoor plumbing add to the cost ofhousing. 
Once a poverty line has been established, it could be applied to data on incomes or on 
expenditure. Most analysts favor expenditure. In many cases, expenditure is far easier to 
-
measure. It also has a conceptual advantage. If incomes vary over time in fairly predictable 
ways (as they are likely to do in a rural economy, say), households can to some extent smooth 
4 Rowntree, 1910, p.86. 
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their living standards from income variability. Anand and Harris (1994) address the choice ofa 
welfare indicator using data from Sri Lanka. They conjecture, and find, that income is a noisy 
indicator of "permanent" income, while household total expenditure per capita is less noisy and 
thus preferred.7 
Within this broad approach, many attempts have been made to improve estimates of 
poverty lines and overcome a host of conceptual and empirical difficulties.s The value of this 
effort depends on the use to be made of poverty lines and hence the required level of precision. 
We discuss and judge some of these efforts from the perspective of two possible uses ofpoverty 
lines - as a means of measuring poverty worldwide and monitoring changes over time, and as a 
means of designing specific actions oriented towards the poor. 
A commonly used poverty line for monitoring progress in reducing poverty worldwide is 
the dollar-a-day measure introduced in the 1990 World Development Report. Based on the 
poverty lines actually used in several low-income countries,9 this poverty line is expressed in 
1985 PPP dollars and refers to household expenditure per person. This measure has several well-
known deficiencies - it does not allow for cost-of-living differentials within countries (Ravallion 
and van de Walle, 1991), it does not distinguish between transient and chronic poverty (World 
Bank, 1990), it only values goods and services delivered through the market (van de Walle and 
Nead, 1994), it does not consider intra-household allocation of expenditure (Haddad and Kanbur, 
1990), it deals in only a rudimentary fashion with differences in household size and composition 
(Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995), and so on. Techniques exist to handle most of these concerns 
-

S Cited in Fisher, 1996.
 
6 Cited in Fisher, 1996.
 
7 They go on to argue that household food expenditure is an even better indicator of pennanent income.
 
8 For useful surveys, see Callan and Nolan, 1991, and Lipton and Ravallion, 1995.
 
9In 1985 PPP prices, the 1990 WDR used a range of income, from $275 to $370 per person a year, to pennit cross­

country comparison. The range spanned the poverty lines estimated for a number of countries - Bangladesh, the
 
Arab Republic of Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, and Tanzania.
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but only at a cost and only with appropriate data. The relevant question therefore is: when is it 
reasonable to ignore these complications and when are they critical? 
The broad elements ofthe answer are clear. As far as overall monitoring is concerned, 
the important issue is the extent to which the quantitative significance of these deficiencies 
changes through time or differs across countries. While it is important to keep these factors in 
mind, their significance must be judged against our ability to measure poverty with any precision 
even in the best of circumstances. Measurement errors arising from different survey techniques, 
samples, timing, and so on make it doubtful that efforts to deal with some of the deficiencies 
noted above will greatly improve our ability to monitor progress in reducing poverty in the 
broad. Or, to put the same point differently, current methods, crude as they are, may well be 
adequate. Gauging the robustness of results through careful use of sensitivity analysis can 
provide some reassurance. This is all the more important in that the deprivation of someone 
living just above the poverty line is almost as severe as that of a person just below it. For this 
reason, it makes sense to use more than one poverty line. lo 
It is reassuring that the use of more than one line generally gives the same overall picture 
regarding the worldwide distribution of poverty and how it is changing over time. Table I 
illustrates this point for two poverty lines - one identifying the poor and the other the extreme 
poor as defined in the 1990 World Development Report. Whichever poverty line one uses, the 
incidence of poverty is highest in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa and lowest in the Middle 
East and North Africa and East Asia. Similarly, whichever poverty line one uses, between 1985 
and 1990 the incidence ofpoverty fell in South Asia, but increased in Latin America and sub­
• 
Saharan Africa. The survey data underlying these numbers cover 80 percent of the population in 
developing countries. Extrapolating to the total population, the higher of the two poverty lines, 
8 
the widely used dollar-a-day poverty line for one individual at 1985 U.S. prices, indicates that 
about 1.3 billion people, or one in three, were living in poverty in the developing world in 1990. 
Table 1: The Incidence Of Poverty 
Poverty Line (1985 
PPP$/person/month) $21.00 $30.42 
Year 1985 1990 1985 1990 
Region (% of population) 
• South Asia 36.76 33.31 60.84 58.60 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 31.65 33.44 51.40 52.89 
• Latin America 13.23 17.21 23.07 27.77 
• East Asia 4.89 4.86 15.72 14.71 
• Middle East & 
North Africa 1.33 0.54 4.49 2.52 
Total 18.25 17.79 33.88 33.52 
Source: Chen, Dart, and Ravallion, 1994. 
The importance of precise measures of poverty increases when we tum to the design of 
specific, poverty-reducing actions because equal treatment of equals is one of the fundamental 
principles of public policy. Take the issue of rural-urban differentials in the cost of living. 
People migrating from rural to urban areas in a developing country may find themselves facing 
an entirely new set of prices, especially for housing and food staples. For example, according to 
Ravallion and van de Walle (1991), average dwelling rents in 1981 were six times higher in 
urban Java than in rural Java. Incorporating such huge differences into location-specific poverty 
lines can of course change the focus of poverty-oriented actions from rural to urban areas. But, 
the quality of the dwelling stock is often better on average in urban areas, and, once allowance is 
-

made for this, Ravallion and van de Walle conclude that the appropriate differential is much 
10 Dominance conditions are a more fonnal solution to the problem of uncertainty about the poverty line (Atkinson, 
1987). 
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smaller - about 10 percent between urban and rural Java. 11 Thus, adjusting for cost-of-living 
differences may be important to ensure equal treatment of urban and rural dwellers, but the 
adjustment will usually be much less than that suggested by a simple comparison of prices. 
Similarly, failure to allow for differential access to goods and services that are not 
purchased in the market can lead to misleading assessments ofpoverty. Thus, two equally poor 
households according to the dollar-a-day definition could have quite different levels ofwellbeing 
if they have different degrees of access to free or heavily subsidized goods and services, or if 
they have different degrees ofaccess to public goods. For example, the subsidy received by the 
poorest decile of the urban population through their use of hospitals and primary health centers 
in Indonesia in 1987 was twice that received by the poorest decile of the rural population (van de 
Walle, 1994). Similarly, if poor people are depleting common resources, the conventional 
estimates will overlook increases in pauperization. For example, Jodha (1995) points to the loss 
of common property resources in dry regions of India. Between 1950 and the early 1980s 
common areas declined by 31 to 55 percent in the study villages. One can see a manifestation of 
narrowed options for succeeding generations in the premature harvesting of trees to make up for 
the reduced availability ofplant material, a process which is not reflected in the national 
accounts. 
Assume that we have handled cost-of-living differentials and similar problems such as 
differences in household size and composition,I2 and that we have identified two equally poor 
households during the survey period. But ifone household is experiencing a temporary fall into 
poverty while the other is chronically poor, the appropriate policy responses towards the two 
-
households should probably be quite different. Specifically, alleviation ofchronic poverty 
I 
II Ravallion and van de Walle (1991).
 
12 The choice of an "equivalence scale" that sets a proportion for children's needs versus those of adults can change
 
commonly held views about poverty. For example, ifeconomies of size are sufficiently strong then the negative
 
relationship between size of household and expenditure per person can be reversed (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995).
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demands increases in the poor's physical and human capital, or in the returns to their labor, while 
insurance and income-stabilization schemes are more appropriate for transient poverty. That 
said, instruments and objectives cannot be so easily segregated. The existence of an effective 
safety net or access to credit to smooth income fluctuations also haS potentially important 
implications for the ability of the chronically poor to escape poverty, as we shall see. 
Available panel data suggest that movement into and out ofpoverty is large. For 
example, data from the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(lCRISAT) survey of six Indian villages from 1975 to 1983 showed that 50 percent of the 
population were poor in a typical year but only 19 percent were poor in every year (World Bank, 
1990). Thus, a substantial core of chronically poor co-exists with considerable movement into 
and out ofpoverty. Jalan and Ravallion (1998) present a number of findings about rural China 
using panel data for six years, 1985 to 1990. They find that transient poverty, defined as the 
poverty that can be attributed to intertemporal variability in consumption, accounts for 37 
percent of total poverty for those households that were below the poverty line on average. 
However, the extent of transient poverty drops to a negligible amount for households whose 
mean consumption is more than 50 percent above the poverty line. The authors also found that 
about half ofmean poverty is attributable to variability in consumption in the poorer provinces, 
while in a relatively well-offprovince with higher average consumption it was much higher, at 
84 percent ofmean poverty. 
The distinction between transient and chronic poverty has emerged as an important issue 
in the context of the East Asian crisis. The traditional concentration ofpoverty in Indonesia, the 
-

hardest-hit country, is in rural areas. Rural poverty has been declining in Indonesia, but in 1997 
it was still at 12.4 percent, compared with 9.2 percent in the urban sector - with the result that 70 
percent of Indonesia's poor were in rural areas in 1997 (Poppele et a1. 1999). But the immediate 
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impact of the crisis has fallen on the financial sector and the corporate sector and can, therefore, 
be expected to generate additional poverty in urban areas. Evidence in support of this view is 
now beginning to appear. A survey of2,000 households suggests that incomes in urban areas 
have fallen by one third, whereas in rural areas the decline has been less than 15 percent 
(Poppele et al.1999). Allocating income support schemes - such as public works programs ­
according to the pre-crisis distribution ofpoverty would have missed many of the newly poor in 
urban areas. 
Imagine that we have constructed poverty lines that truly treat equal households equally. 
Does this necessarily imply the equal treatment of equal individuals? The answer depends on 
how households allocate income or food to individual household members. To test the 
quantitative importance ofmoving from household-based measures to individual-based ones, 
Haddad and Kanbur (1990) use data on calorie intake by individuals based on 24-hour recall by 
the mother in a sample of rural households in southern Philippines. They find that ignoring 
within-household inequality understates total inequality - for example, the Gini index increases 
by about 35 percent when the base moves from households to individuals. On the other hand, 
rankings across groups producing different crops or having different tenurial status were not 
affected by the change in base. 
The way in which households allocate income among members can have a significant 
impact on policy formation and implementation. In the unitary model,13 which assumes a single 
utility function that governs the household as a whole, policymakers can only shift household 
allocation by shifting relative prices. Other models move away from the notion of income­
• 
pooling and a common utility function and assume instead that household members engage in a 
bargaining process or else behave independently (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Homey 
13 Singh, Squire, Strauss (1986). 
12 
1981, Aldennan et a11995, Haddad et aI., 1997). In these models, the impact that public 
transfers have on welfare may be affected by the identity of the recipient. In support of this, 
Thomas (1990) shows that the impact of non-labor income accruing to women in Brazilian 
households on per capita calorie and protein intake, fertility, child survival, and weight-for­
height for children less than eight years old is different from what would have occurred had the 
income accrued to men. For example, unearned income accruing to the mother raises the 
probability of child survival by 20 times that of a similar increase in the unearned income of the 
father. 
Similarly, ifinfonnation is not pooled, then it matters to whom policy initiatives ar~ 
directed. Faulty policy assumptions may result in the nonadoption of, say, new technology, or the 
adoption of projects that make a group worse off. For example, in the Dominican Republic, a 
reforestation initiative assumed that men and women used wood for the same purposes, and 
consequently only consulted men. Only mid-way through the project were women consulted, and 
it turned out that their needs for fuelwood were not met by the project - and it was too late for 
those needs to be addressed. 14 
The many difficulties of measuring poverty along conventional lines notwithstanding, the 
endeavor has seen considerable progress in the last 25 years thanks to the expanding availability 
of household surveys. Between the World Bank's first progress report on poverty in 1993 and its 
second one in 1996, the number of low-income and middle-income countries with household 
data on income or expenditure more than doubled from 31 to 71 (World Bank, 1996). This 
availability of household surveys of some fonn or other has improved our knowledge of poverty 
-

substantially and clarified the links between growth in national income and changes in 
inequality, the issue to which we now tum. 
14 Fortmann and Rocheleau (1989) in Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997). 
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Growth, Inequality, and Poverty 
Those who viewed poverty as a lack of income or commodities naturally turned their 
attention to the expansion of per capita income -- economic growth -- as a potential strategy to 
reduce poverty. The only question was whether income expansion accrued as much to the poor 
as to the rest of society, or whether it left them behind. In 1955, Simon Kuznets called attention 
to the consideration of economic growth and income inequality, describing it as "central to much 
ofeconomic analysis and thinking.,,15 He examined the question with about 5 percent empirical 
information and 95 percent speculation, by his own account, suggesting explanations for - and 
theoretical arguments against - his scant data. 16 What is now known as the Kuznets curve or 
Inverted U Hypothesis comes from a hypothetical numerical exercise. The idea is that primarily 
agricultural economies start out with an initially equitable distribution with a low average, but 
that as they develop, portions of the population migrate to other sectors with greater inequality 
but higher averages. Initially, this causes inequality to worsen. But, as countries continue to 
progress, more of the rural sector moves out of agriculture and inequality eventually decreases. 
This picture was largely based on Lewis's dual economy theory (1954). In his numerical 
example, Kuznets observed that the share of the lowest portion of the population fell in all cases 
(but no such pattern was found in his data). 
Kuznets based his speculation on longitudinal data from the development of 
industrialized countries, but many subsequent estimations used cross-country data to explore the 
hypothesis. 17 These studies found a pattern of significant increases in inequality as income levels 
rose, with ambiguous effects for poverty reduction, ranging from absolute impoverishment to 
-
slower than average gains. Later studies criticized the cross-country exercises for ignoring 
IS Kuznets (1955).
 
16 Most of his figures are from the United States, United Kingdom, and Gennany, with some references to India,
 
Prussia, Ceylon, and Puerto Rico (op. cit.).
 
17 Ahluwalia et al. (1979), Paukert (1973), Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Ahluwalia (1976).
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country-specific effects and measurement differences, and also looked at newly available country 
time-series data. IS The Kuznets V faded from view, leaving the conclusion that inequality and 
income are not systematically related according to some immutable law of development. 19 Thus, 
one study of49 countries finds that there is no statistical relationship between inequality and 
income in forty cases (more than 80 percent of the sample). Four out ofthe remaining nine 
exhibited a V-shaped relationship rather than the inverted V hypothesized by Kuznets. So the 
Kuznets curve appeared in only 5 out of49 countries.20 Nor does there seem to be a simple 
relationship between inequality and growth. Chen and Ravallion (1997) found that inequality 
was not correlated with growth in mean consumption in 43 spells, a spell being a period for· 
which two household surveys are available for a country. 
In place of the Kuznets curve, the recent literature points to a different empirical 
regularity. As more time series data become available, it appears that aggregate inequality as 
measured by, say, the Gini index does not typically change dramatically from year to year. In 
fact, one study of panel data for 49 countries found that 91.8 percent of the variance in inequality 
was due to cross-country variance while only 0.85 percent was attributed to variance over time.21 
The same study also showed that few countries exhibited statistically significant trends over 
time. Thirty-two out of 49 countries revealed no trend, while 10 showed an increasing trend in 
inequality and 7 a decreasing one (Li, Squire, Zou, 1998). This is not to say that inequality does 
not change. Obviously it does and in some cases - China, Eastern Europe, UK - quite rapidly. 
Nevertheless, for many countries over long periods of time inequality is surprisingly persistent. 
And where inequality has changed rapidly, it has increased. We do not have solid evidence of 
-

rapid reductions in inequality. For the seven countries where inequality decreased in the Li, 
18 Anand and Kanbur (1993), Bruno et al. (1998), Deininger and Squire (1998).
 
19 In his review of income distribution and development, Kanbur (1998) describes this conclusion as the "emerging
 
consensus".
 
20 Deininger and Squire, 1998., p.279.
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Squire, and Zou sample the average rate of decrease was 0.3 Gini points a year. This implies 
that it would take about 60 years for a country with Latin American levels of inequality to move 
to the average of all developing countries. 
That said, even small changes in aggregate inequality can have a significant impact on 
poverty. It is difficult to establish a simple formula relating changes in aggregate measures of 
inequality such as the Gini index to changes in poverty. Thus, the Gini index can increase or 
decrease and leave poverty unchanged if the distribution above the poverty line changes. And, 
poverty can increase or decrease without any change in the Gini index if there are appropriate 
offsetting changes in distribution among the non-poor. To explore the impact of inequality on 
the poor, we need to specify the change in distribution more precisely. 
One specification that has received some attention22 assumes that the Lorenz curve shifts 
by a constant proportion of the difference between the actual share of total income accruing to 
each income group and equal shares. This leads to analytically tractable elasticities of the 
Poverty Gap with respect to the Gini index.23 Using the poverty line of one dollar a day, the 
elasticity can be as high as 8.2 (Brazil), 12.6 (Chile), and even 21.1 (Thailand). For countries 
with lower incomes and hence more poverty, however, the elasticities are much lower - 0.82 
(India), 0.76 (Uganda), and 0.40 (Zambia). Nevertheless, the experience of two countries reveals 
the significance of sustained falls in inequality over time. From the early 60s to the early 90s, 
Thailand saw its Gini index rise by 0.31 Gini points a year; Norway saw its fall by a similar 
amount - 0.34 Gini points a year. In Thailand, the incomes ofthe poorest quintile grew at half 
• 
.. 
21 Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998, pA.
 
22 See Kakwani, 1980 and Lipton and Ravallion, 1995.
 
23 The poverty gap is defmed as the amount of transfer (perfectly targeted) required to bring every one up to the
 
poverty line expressed as a proportion of the poverty line times the total population.
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the rate ofmean per capita income; in Norway they grew almost 80 percent faster than the 
24 
mean. 
Moreover, while there is no evidence of any systematic link between inequality and the 
level of income, nor between inequality and the rate of growth (see evidence cited above), there 
may be a reverse relationship from initial inequality in income or assets to growth. Clarke 
(1996) conducts one of the most careful econometric studies in the literature and finds a strong 
negative and statistically significant effect of initial inequality in income on future growth. He 
concludes that a reduction in inequality from one standard deviation above the mean to one 
standard deviation below would increase the long-run growth rate by 1.3 percentage points a 
year. In contrast, subsequent research using higher-quality data have found a positive impact of 
initial inequality on growth (Li and Zou, 1998 and Forbes, 1998). 
While the evidence on initial income inequality may therefore be mixed, several authors 
have found a strong relationship between growth and the initial distribution ofvarious types of 
assets. For example, Birdsall and Londono (1997) find that the initial distribution of human 
capital affects future growth, while Deininger and Squire (1998) find that the initial unequal 
distribution of land reduces future growth. One thing to be careful of in these aggregate growth 
regressions is the possibility of an aggregation bias. Ravallion (1998) found such a bias to be 
quite large, and a consistent micro model of consumption growth at the farm-household level 
indicated a far more harmful effect of asset inequality on consumption growth. These 
conclusions point to the possibility of identifying redistributive policies that increase growth and 
could therefore yield a double benefit for the poor. 
-

24 Authors' calculation using the Deininger-Squire data base. 
17 
From Mechanical Relationships to Policy 
Searching for a mechanical link between inequality and income is not likely to be fruitful. 
There exist too many different experiences. Nor does such an approach lead to policy insights 
(Kanbur, 1998). Both growth and inequality are outcomes of economic policies as well as 
institutional capacity, and are subject to external trends and shocks. Moreover, there is now a 
substantial empirical literature on the range of factors that influence growth (Barro and Sala-I­
Martin, 1995, Easterly, et al., 1993) and a smaller one on the factors influencing inequality 
(Bourguignon and Morrison, 1990, Li, Squire, Zou, 1998). It is odd, however, that analysts have 
typically looked for mechanical links when investigating growth and inequality jointly, largely 
ignoring the role of policy. And when they have investigated the role ofpolicy, they have 
usually looked at growth and inequality separately. Yet the key piece of information from the 
policy-makers' standpoint is how policies influence both growth and inequality. 
Policies to help the poor should examine how to increase growth and improve equality at 
the same time, or at least how to mitigate inequality-generating growth with pro-poor measures. 
Lundberg and Squire (1999) demonstrate the importance of examining the impact of policy on 
both growth and inequality. They estimate separate "standard" growth and inequality equations 
based on the existing literature. These regressions reveal one common variable - education­
that is significant in both equations. Education involves a trade-off -- it reduces growth but 
improves inequality. This is immediate confirmation that the separate treatment of growth and 
inequality could be quite misleading from a policy perspective. 
The estimation of separate standard models indicates that three variables - openness, civil 
-
liberties, and land distribution - are exclusively significant either to growth or to equality. This 
suggests that the policy maker has ample room to choose a package ofpolicies that benefits both 
growth and equality. But the three variables are mutually exclusive by assumption. Lundberg 
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and Squire rerun the standard regressions but now they include all variables in both equations. 
In the joint model, land distribution and civil liberties are confirmed as mutually exclusive 
variables but openness now signifies a trade-off - it increases growth but worsens equality. 
Lundberg and Squire conclude that, at least for these simple models, the independent analysis of 
growth and inequality produces potentially misleading, or at least incomplete, results for the 
policy maker. Their results also suggest, however, that, even when growth and inequality are 
analyzed jointly, there are still likely to be mutually exclusive variables implying a degree of 
flexibility for the policy maker. 
Lundberg and Squire also examine the joint determination of growth and inequality in 
more realistic specifications. Openness, financial depth, and land redistribution emerge as 
policies that consistently spur growth across different specifications. They also find that with the 
significant exception of openness to trade these policies benefit equality, although these results 
do not hold for all specifications and their quantitative impact is small. Indeed, a general result 
emerging from this analysis is that growth is much more sensitive than equality to policy 
interventions. For example, the elasticity of growth with respect to the index of openness is­
0.33; with respect to inequality, it is 0.01. In no case does a variable have a relatively larger 
influence on inequality than growth. This is consistent with historical experience: growth rates 
are much more volatile than inequality.25 
These results illustrate the importance of treating growth and inequality together. A 
strong growth performance with even a relatively modest reduction in inequality will have a 
tremendous impact on the incomes of the poor. Historical evidence supports this view. Data 
-

from the early 1960s to the early 1990s show that both Indonesia and Taiwan experienced rapid 
growth and at least no deterioration in inequality - for both countries inequality fell but the trend 
2S See Easterly et al. (1993) on growth and Li, Squire and Zou (1998) on inequality. 
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was not statistically significant. During this period, the poorest quintile in Indonesia saw their 
incomes increase at a rate of 4.8 percent a year; in Taiwan the poorest quintile did even better ­
an annual rate of growth of 5.8 percent.26 
Understanding the policies and development strategies of these countries should provide 
valuable guidance for other countries. The 1990 World Development Report pointed to: a stable 
macroeconomic environment (to encourage private investment), relatively undistorted sectoral 
terms of trade (to avoid bias against agriculture), relatively undistorted factor markets (to avoid 
capital intensive production), and public provision of infrastructure especially to rural areas (to 
avoid urban bias). Another feature underlying the success of these countries was their emphasis 
on human development. They invested heavily in the education and health of their populations 
as a contributing factor to growth but also as a benefit in its own right. We look at this additional 
dimension ofpoverty in more detail in the following section. 
III. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
Measuring Human Development 
A recent survey of poverty concludes that: "The generally preferred indicator of 
household living standards is a suitably comprehensive measure of current consumption, given 
by a price-weighted aggregate over all marketed commodities consumed by the household from 
all sources (purchases, gifts, and own production).,,27 This carefully worded statement 
summarizes well the conventional view on measuring poverty. In principle, this definition 
captures the value of publicly provided goods and services that are often supplied free of charge 
-
or else are highly subsidized as long as there is a relevant market price. In practice, however, 
this may not always be done. There are many such goods and services" but two which are almost 
26 Authors' calculations using the Deininger-Squire data set. 
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always supplied in this manner are basic education and health services. Moreover, the definition 
fails to capture public goods - spraying swamps to eliminate malaria for example - many of 
which influence health outcomes. Because the level and quality of basic education and health 
services, including public goods, varies significantly across countries, most analysts recommend 
the inclusion of social indicators in arriving at an overall assessment of living standards. For 
example, the 1990 World Development Report "supplements a consumption-based poverty 
measure with others, such as nutrition, life expectancy, under 5.mortality, and school enrollment 
rates.,,28 
The key word in the preceding quote is 'supplements'- the social indicators are 
providing information not captured in conventional measures of poverty. Command over market-
purchased commodities is important but so is access to p~blic goods. An alternative approach 
treats income (or expenditure) as an input to other, more fundamental goals. For example, the 
focus of the 1980 World Development Report "is on absolute poverty - a condition of life so 
characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy, and disease as to be beneath any reasonable definition 
of human decency.,,29 This represents a marked difference from conventional definitions in that 
it does not mention income or expenditure but focuses on wellbeing as revealed by nutritional 
status, educational attainment, and health status. To be sure, income may be important to the 
realization of these outcomes, but there is no universal or guaranteed transformation of income 
into these outcomes and, according to this view, it is the outcomes that count. 
This view has received intellectual support from Sen's definition of poverty in terms of 
"capabilities".30 Sen calls a capability the substantive freedoms people enjoy to lead the kind of 
-
life they have reason to value, such as social functioning, better basic education and healthcare, 
... 
27 Lipton and Ravallion, 1995, p.2573-4.
 
28 World Bank (1990), p. 26.
 
29 World Bank (1980), p. 32.
 
30 Sen (1981) and (1984).
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and longevity.31 The arguments in favor of the capability approach are that: poverty can be 
characterized by capability deprivation, since these are intrinsically important while low income 
is only instrumentally significant; low income is not the only influence on capability deprivation; 
and the impact of income on capabilities is variable among different communities, families, and 
individuals. It is interesting to note that there is a connection going from capability improvement 
to greater earning power and not only the other way around. This points to the importance of a 
citizenry well-prepared to take advantage of economic opportunities. 
The United Nations Development Program has played the leading role in defining 
poverty in terms of human development and has introduced several measures including the 
Human Development Index and, of particular relevance to the present discussion, the Human 
Poverty Index (HPI). This index concentrates on three aspects of human deprivation -longevity, 
literacy, and living standard. Longevity is measured by the percentage of people who die before 
age 40, literacy by the percentage of adults who are literate, and living standard by a combination 
of the percentage of the population with access to health services, the percentage of the 
population with access to safe water, and the percentage of malnourished children under five. 
While information on each aspect is valuable, aggregation into a single index raises a host of 
serious issues. Apart from the loss of policy-relevant information, aggregation requires the 
arbitrary selection of weights, a feature subject to considerable criticism in the literature.32 
Unlike the conventional poverty measures discussed above, the HPI at best ranks 
countries across the world. Because they are national means - like GDP per capita - they tell us 
nothing about the poor. While governments are presumably interested in the life expectancy of 
-
all their citizens, just as they are presumably interested in the incomes of all members of the 
population, a special focus on poverty requires that we look at those who can expect to live the 
31 Sen (1999). 
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fewest number of years. National averages do not allow ranking of households within countries. 
And, as such, they cannot be used to distinguish the poor from the non-poor. This, of course, 
reflects the absence of household surveys that allow the computation of relevant distributions. 
For some measures of human development, however, household-level data are beginning to 
become available. Wherever such information is available, households that are poor according 
to an expenditure-based measure invariably score badly on other indicators of wellbeing. Tables 
2 and 3 illustrate this point. 
Table 2 shows that the poorest households by income level in five Latin American 
countries attain fewer years of education than richer households. In the poorest households the 
number of years of education for 25-year-olds ranges from about one half to one fifth ofthat 
attained by their counterparts in the wealthiest households. In each country, the number of years 
of education increases steadily as one moves up the income scale. 
Table 2:	 Average Years Of Education For 25 Year Olds By Income Level 
Data From Recent Household Surveys For Five Latin American Countries 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Chile 6.24 6.88 7.09 7.40 7.69 8.16 8.47 9.80 10.88 12.83 
Brazil 1.98 2.49 2.97 3.41 3.66 4.40 4.49 5.98 7.43 10.53 
Mexico 2.14 2.95 3.78 4.15 4.78 5.66 6.06 7.24 8.89 12.13 
Peru 3.87 4.17 4.95 5.69 6.60 7.05 7.66 8.28 9.04 10.80 
Venezuela 4.66 4.94 5.27 5.72 6.23 6.68 7.20 7.78 8.58 10.81 
Source: Facing up to inequality in Latin America, Inter-American Development Bank, 1998. -

32 See, for example, McGillivray and White (1993), and Ravallion (1997) on the subject of the similar Human 
Development Index. 
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Table 3 reveals an almost identical (but opposite) picture for sickness and wealth in 
developing countries. The very poor are generally much sicker than the rest of the population. 
For the sample ofAsian and African countries shown in Table 3 the proportion of children born 
in the past 5 years but no longer living is between 3 and 6 times larger for the poorest decile than 
for the richest decile. In two of the countries - Tanzania and Uganda - almost half the children 
born in the poorest decile in the past five years have died. As with education but in reverse, the 
table reveals a steady decline in this measure ofchild mortality as wealth increases. 
Table 3: Proportion Of Children Who Were Born In The Past 5 Years Who Are No 
Longer Living, By Wealth 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bangladesh 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.06 
Indonesia 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Madagascar 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.1 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Pakistan 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Tanzania 0.49 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 
Uganda 0.48 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.07 
Source: Bonilla-Chacin and Hammer, 1999, from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted by the 
MACRO corporation for USAID. 
It should not be concluded from this evidence that the identification of the poor according 
to different dimensions ofpoverty will lead to exactly the same results. A study using data 
collected in 1985 in Cote d'Ivoire showed relatively modest correlations between different 
measures ofpoverty. Of the 30 percent of the population identified as poor by a measure based 
on consumption per capita adjusted for family composition, less than half were so identified 
• 
.. 
where the criterion was the average education level of adults (Glewwe and van der Gaag, 1990). 
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A similar conclusion emerges from a study of six developing countries - "Individuals with lower 
incomes on average also have lower welfare in other dimensions ... However, it is also noticeable 
that the correlations are rather modest - income usually explains :very little of the variation in 
non-money metric welfare indicators" (Appleton and Song, 1999, p.25). This study, however, 
makes no allowance for family composition in arriving at its measure ofper capita consumption. 
Thus, while there is clearly an overlap -- those who lack income are also those who are less well 
educated and suffer more sickness -- the correspondence is less than complete and can, in some 
cases, be quite small. 
We saw earlier that the poor, on balance, gain from broad-based growth (they certainly 
have little to gain from contraction or stagnation). From this perspective then a poverty-reducing 
strategy that does not give a central role to equity-improving growth is unlikely to be successful. 
How should the strategy change if the definition ofpoverty is expanded to incorporate human 
development as measured by, say, life expectancy or literacy? This extension captures important 
dimensions of poverty that are otherwise missed by conventional income or expenditure 
measures especially as used in applied work. It serves to remind us that there are additional 
policy instruments that need to be kept in mind. Moreover, there are important interactions at 
play - both among various elements ofhuman development and between those elements and 
growth. 
The Seamless Web 
A society faced with the task ofproviding social services to the poor may well wonder 
where to begin. The lives of the poor are ringed with a tangle ofvicious circles, with the virtuous 
• 
circles seemingly hovering just out of reach. These interactions have been recognized for some 
... 
time. WDR1980, for example, stresses that the "different elements ofhuman development are 
key determinants of each other" (p.68) and speaks of the "seamless web of interrelations" (p.69). 
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Efforts to improve on past performance in delivering social services are better informed than 
ever about these interactions. 
For example, many studies have shown that mothers' education has a strong positive 
effect on their children's health. We now know that this occurs because education enables the 
mother to obtain and process information. Thus, a study using data from northeastern Brazil for 
1986 shows that parents who regularly made use of the mass media had healthier children as 
measured by height for age. Once variables for use ofthe media are included, mother's years of 
schooling no longer have an independent effect. One interpretation of this result is that 
education is necessary for mothers to process information, but that access to relevant material 
through the mass media is necessary for education to have an effect on child health (Thomas, 
Strauss, and Henriques, 1991). A study using data for Morocco from 1990-91 provides support 
for this interpretation. It found that a mother's basic health knowledge had a direct effect on 
child health, and that education and access to media were shown to be the vehicles for acquiring 
that knowledge (Glewwe, 1997). 
And there are many studies showing that better health improves school attendance and 
performance. Often, however, these studies use cross-sectional data and rely on recall. To 
overcome this problem, a recent study uses longitudinal data to investigate the impact of child 
health and nutrition on school enrollments in rural Pakistan. Unlike most other work, these data 
allow the authors to relax the assumption that child health and nutrition is predetermined rather 
than determined by household choices. Their preferred point estimates indicate that child 
health/nutrition is three times more important for enrollment than conventional approaches 
-

would suggest (Alderman et aI., 1997). They also find that the effects are larger for girls than for 
boys. While this study demonstrates that better child health and nutrition induces greater 
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schooling, its methodological point increases our confidence in the results of previous work 
indicating a positive effect on performance as well. 
Human Development and Growth 
In addition to the interrelations among various aspects of human development, there are 
important linkages between human development and income earning capacity - income is a 
major determinant and outcome of human development. The specific way in which the poor 
participate in growth tends to be through increased or more productive use of "their most 
abundant asset," labor. But part of the intrinsic characteristics ofpoverty -lack of education, 
poor nutrition and health - also contribute to functional effects on their capacity to work. Some 
of the links that either enhance or impair the poor's capabilities may give an idea of the 
multifarious interactions between human development and growth. For example, a well­
nourished person can work more, thereby earning more and both consuming more and saving 
more, ensuring future nourishment and work capacity. Similarly, a person with primary 
education can take a higher-paying job, ensuring the ability ofher children to attend school. We 
briefly illustrate from the extensive empirical literature on these links. 
Drawing on data from a survey of 1,725 households in Conakry, Guinea in 1990, Glick 
and Sahn (1997) examine the impact of education on labor earnings by sector of employment. 
Two results are noteworthy. First, education raises the earnings of men and women in the three 
sectors examined - self employment, private wage employment, and public wage employment. 
Thus, even in a very low-income urban area such as Conakry the benefits of schooling are 
clearly visible. And second, the authors note that the infonnal sector (which overlaps with the 
-

small enterprises of the self-employed) is expected to be an important source ofjob growth in 
Africa. Even here, earnings are shown to increase with level of education. For example, 
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completing primary schooling raises the hourly enterprise profits for self-employed women by 
30 percent. 
Measures of nutritional status and health status have also been shown to have positive 
impacts on wages and productivity. Moreover, these impacts are greater for the poor than the 
non-poor. Strauss and Thomas (1997) show that controlling for a range of factors taller men in 
the U.S.A. earn more - a one percent increase in height is associated with a 1 percent increase in 
wages. The same relationship for Brazilian males is much more powerful - the same 1 percent 
increase in height implies a 7 percent increase in wages. In their survey of the literature, Strauss 
and Thomas (1998) conclude that improvements in health do result in increases in productivity 
and wages and, more importantly for present purposes, the "effects are likely to be greatest for 
the most vulnerable - the poorest and those with little education." 
Without these basic building blocks, the poor are unable to take advantage of income­
earning opportunities that come with growth.33 At the same time, society suffers the loss of their 
potential contributions. Therefore, the provision ofbasic social services, besides being important 
in its own right, constitutes an important element in the growth of a society. As one would 
expect, national comparisons do indeed indicate a broad correlation between income levels and 
life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality and so on. But growth in income by itself does not 
necessarily translate into improvements in health status or educational attainment; nor does 
improved health or better education necessarily lead to increases in income. 
For example, there are some striking outliers from the general correlation between 
income and other measures of wellbeing. The 1994 Human Development Report showed Sri 
-
Lanka, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Guinea all with per capita incomes in the $400-$500 range, but 
life expectancies of, respectively, 71, 65, 58 and 44 years, and infant mortality rates of, 
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respectively, 24, 53, 99 and 135 per 1000 live births. Outliers often provide valuable insights but 
there are at least two interpretations in this case. 
First, the resources generated by growth may not be used in a way that promotes 
improvements in other indicators. Growth provides an opportunity but that opportunity has to be 
seized. Anand and Ravallion (1993) provide support for this view. For a sample of 22 countries, 
they show that the observed relationship between improvements in life expectancy and increases 
in mean income disappears once measures for income-poverty and public spending per capita on 
health are introduced. This suggests that growth in mean income translates into improvements in 
life expectancy only if growth reduces poverty (increases in the income of the poor are critical to 
significant improvements in life expectancy) and if adequate provision is made for public 
healthcare. It is the way in which the fruits of economic growth are used that is critical. Sri 
Lanka has used its income effectively in this view, whereas Guinea has not. 
But there is a second interpretation as well. The structure of incentives and the 
complementary investments to ensure that society, and especially the poor, reap maximum 
benefit, including increased incomes, from investment in education and health may not be in 
place (Squire, 1993). There is evidence in support of this view especially for education. Thus, 
cross-country regressions suggest that the impact of growth in educational capital on growth in 
GDP per worker are "consistently small and negative" (Pritchett, 1996). Pritchett squares the 
circle between the apparently positive effect of education at the individual level and its 
apparently insignificant effect at the aggregate level by distinguishing between rent seeking and 
productive activities (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991). If the returns to being educated are to 
-
be found at least in part in rent seeking then the individuals receiving education will enjoy 
33 For example, Ravallion and Datt (1999) show that non-farm economic growth in India's states was less effective 
in reducing poverty in states with poor basic education. 
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increases in income but national income will not necessarily rise. According to this view, 
countries like Sri Lanka have enjoyed the immediate benefits ofbetter health and more education 
but have not realized the increases in income that could accompany them. 
The argument that growth does not necessarily translate into social progress and the 
argument that improvements in health and education do not necessarily lead to higher incomes 
can, of course, be turned around. Where countries have used the benefits of growth to finance 
basic healthcare and access to education for all, and where countries have put in place incentive 
structures and complementary investments to ensure that better health and education lead to 
higher incomes, the poor have benefited doubly - they are healthier and better educated, and they 
have increased their consumption. The 1990 World Development Report made progress on these 
two fronts the foundation of its two-part strategy, arguing that they were mutually reinforcing 
and that one without the other was not sufficient. 
Most of the East Asian countries, prior to the recent crisis, illustrate what can be 
achieved. Poverty fell dramatically in East Asia from 1975, when roughly six out often East 
Asians lived in absolute poverty, to 1995, when only about two did. At the same time, and in part 
propelling these achievements, governments invested in human capital through public 
expenditures on education and health. Over the same 20-year period, life expectancy increased 
by more than 9 years, the average years of education rose by 60 percent, and infant mortality fell 
from 73 per thousand births to 35.34 While these achievements may be eroded to some extent 
during the current crisis, their lasting impact will still represent a degree of progress not seen 
elsewhere. 
Several recent empirical studies at the household level using panel data provide further ­
support for a strong interaction between human development and growth in incomes. For 
34 Population-weighted averages for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan. 
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example, a panel of 891 households in Peru was studied during the period 1994 to 1997. The 
study found that the higher the education of the household head in 1994, the larger the growth in 
per capita expenditures in the subsequent period (Chong and Hentschel, 1999). Similarly, panel 
data for 2,678 Vietnamese households covering the period 1993 to 1998 came to the same 
conclusion - while on average those households whose head had no education saw expenditure 
per capita decline, on average all households whose head had primary education or more saw per 
capita expenditure increase, with the increase for those with upper secondary education being 
three times that for those with primary education (Zaman 1999). 
Incorporating other dimensions of poverty -longevity and literacy - into our definition 
expands considerably the range ofpolicy instruments available to alleviate poverty. Even if their 
incomes do not increase, policies that improve the health of individuals and increase their 
capacity to absorb and exchange information improve the quality of their lives. But, and this is 
the lasting lesson ofpre-crisis East Asia, where policies and programs to improve health and 
expand education are combined with government action designed to promote investment and 
broad-based growth, the benefits to the poor are that much greater. Additional country-level 
research to illuminate the appropriate balance between policies for countries at different levels of 
development would yield valuable lessons. Transferring such lessons to the countries of sub­
Saharan Africa and South Asia, home to 70 percent of the world's poor, still remains an 
important challenge in the fight to reduce poverty. Yet even as this challenge goes unanswered, 
new challenges are coming to the fore. The risks to the poor and non-poor alike of large 
fluctuations in capital flows are now abundantly visible in East Asia. And, as we shall explore in 
-

the next section, risk manifests itself in a multitude of forms as far as the poor are concerned. 
31
 
IV. VULNERABILITY AND VOICE 
Asking the Poor 
Conventional measures ofpoverty draw heavily on the statistical infonnation contained 
in household surveys combined with a more or less arbitrary cut-off separating the poor from the 
non-poor. An alternative empirical approach to measuring poverty involves asking people what, 
to them, constitutes poverty. Initial investigations along these lines were designed to elicit 
infonnation about an expenditure-based or income-based poverty line. For example, respondents 
might be asked: what income would they consider to be the minimum needed to make ends 
meet?35 More recent work - participatory poverty assessments - are much more open-ended, 
interactive and qualitative and allow people to describe what constitutes poverty in whatever 
dimension they choose. 
Participatory surveys are designed to learn how individuals from various social groups 
assess their own poverty and existing poverty reduction strategies; how various survival 
strategies operate; which government poverty reduction strategies people prefer; and which they 
are prepared to support. The findings are meant to refocus, elaborate, or validate conclusions 
drawn from conventional poverty assessments.36 At the same time, participatory poverty 
assessments pay special attention to process with the aim of engaging a range of stakeholders, 
generating involvement, maximizing local ownership and building commitment to change. Each 
one is different, reflecting the country context, the time available and the infonnation needs of 
policymakers.37 Thus, the specific questions each one addresses will vary widely. 
• 
35 See for example Goedhart, et al. (1977) and Hagenaars (1986).
 
36 Salmen (1995).
 
37 Narayan and Nyamwaya (1996).
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The World Bank began systematically requiring a poverty assessment of each country as 
a result of the findings of the 1990 WDR.38 Poverty assessments use a variety of sources to 
diagnose structural causes ofpoverty. Taking their cue from researchers such as N.S. Jodha, 
Robert Chambers, and Lawrence Salmen who had been asking the poor for their own 
assessments of their economic status, the poverty assessments began in 1993 to include 
participatory surveys of their own. The participatory poverty assessments draw their 
methodology from other analytical instruments used in the World Bank: beneficiary assessments, 
designed to obtain client feedback, and participatory rural appraisals, which involve the 
stakeholders in forming a rapid understanding of a particular location. As of July 1998, 43 
policy-oriented participatory surveys had been undertaken at the World Bank, with at least ten 
more now underway. Ofthe 43 completed participatory assessments, 28 were in Africa, 6 in 
Latin America, 5 in Eastern Europe, and 4 in Asia. 
Although expressed in many different ways, two aspects ofpoverty that emerge from 
participatory assessments and which are not captured in conventional surveys ~eem especially 
important. One is a concern with risk and volatility of incomes, and is often expressed as a 
feeling ofvulnerability. In talking about their situation, the poor detailed the ways in which 
fluctuations, seasons, and crises affected their well-being. From these descriptions, we come to 
understand the particular importance ofpoverty not just as a state of having little, but also of 
being vulnerable to losing the little one has. The poor also described their interactions with 
government employees and institutions, revealing another important aspect oflife in poverty: 
lack ofpolitical power. This lack of voice and political rights, often described as a sense of 
• 
powerlessness, is the second dimension ofpoverty revealed by participatory assessments and is 
described by some as the most fundamental characteristic ofpoverty.. 
38 World Bank (1991). 
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Vulnerability "has two sides: the external side ofexposure to shocks, stress and risk; and 
the internal side of defenselessness, meaning a lack ofmeans to cope without damaging loss".39 
Outside sources of risk range from irregular rainfall and epidemics to crime and violence, as well 
as the structural vulnerability ofhomes and civil conflict. During the civil war in Tajikistan, 
economic activity in the affected areas ground to a halt, and in its aftermath, women without 
grown males to protect them still felt particularly vulnerable. Thus, the poor perceived peace 
and security as the highest priority, even over better food and shelter. With peace, people in 
Tajikistan felt that the economic and political situation would improve and so would physical 
security (World Bank, 1998a). Faced with a great deal of risk, the poor try to minimize their 
vulnerability to disaster by diversifying their income. For example, in Kenya, the poor engage in 
activities such as small-scale subsistence farming, peddling and hawking, manual labor, illicit 
brewing, welding and cobbling, and operating small-scale businesses. But as we shall see, these 
kinds of coping mechanisms are inadequate. 
The poor suffer from risk because they lack the means to protect themselves adequately 
against it - this is what makes them vulnerable. If a contingency occurs, the poor have few 
assets to dispose of in addressing the problem, or the depletion of those assets must plunge them 
further into long-term poverty. And they often cannot borrow to meet their needs. In Kenya, 
only 4 percent of the poor had access to credit through banks and another 3 percent through 
cooperatives, mainly because property requirements exclude them. Thus the poor in Djibouti, 
Zambia, and Tajikistan associate poverty with insecurity, uncertainty, and vulnerability.40 
The Zambia participatory poverty assessment points out that definitions of poverty and 
vulnerability at the local level often pick out characteristics that refer to people who are at or 
• 
.. 
beyond the margins of the local community, since an entire village community may well be 
39 Chambers (1995). 
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below a standard national "poverty line" measure, but most will still conceive of themselves as 
coping. Frequently the idea of a secure livelihood is perceived as more important than 
maximizing income, and thus the local understandings of people about their livelihoods have 
more to do with vulnerability than poverty (World Bank 1994, p. 34). For example, the report 
presented evidence that growing a wide spread of crops in terms ofboth food supply and cash 
income reduces the vulnerability of populations to both environmental and market-based shocks 
and reduces the seasonal dimension ofvulnerability as well. Still, common characteristics 
associated with the rural poor are a combination of age, childlessness and social isolation for 
widows and divorcees, illustrating how vulnerability means lacking the means to cope. 
In Cameroon, the poor in all regions distinguish themselves from the non-poor on five 
main criteria: the presence ofhunger in their households; fewer meals a day and nutritionally 
inadequate diets; higher percentage of their meager and irregular income being spent on food; 
non-existent or low sources ofcash income; and a feeling ofpowerlessness and an inability to 
make themselves heard (World Bank, 1995). This last factor can be seen in concrete terms by 
the inability ofmost poor in Cameroon to obtain an identity card, which makes them legally 
nonexistent, unable to vote, barred from work, travel, and economic activities such as having a. 
bank account or obtaining a loan. One retired man in Yaounde, the capital, said: "The more time 
passes, the more poor we become; on top of that, we have no security anymore, everywhere we 
are insulted, pushed aside; and we here are poor, even the government ignores us (Mfoulou et aI., 
1994 p. 139)." A widow announced, "Everywhere, health, food, and school is for the bigwigs 
who took all the money... (p. 140)." Thus, while income or income-related dimensions of 
poverty feature prominently, the participatory approach unearths the poor's concern with ­
isolation and powerlessness. 
40 World Bank (1994, 1997 and 1998a). 
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Economically marginalized groups tend to be socially marginalized as well, so that they 
are disadvantaged with respect to both resources and power. 41 In Kenya, Cameroon, Gabon, and 
Zambia, the poor reported that they felt powerless and unable to make their voices heard. In 
Gabon and Zambia, the government carried out projects without consulting the communities that 
were meant to benefit from them, and in Kenya the poor complained that district officials tended 
not to go to villages or only passed through quickly without talking to the poor about their 
problems. Interviews with those officials revealed that they were unaware ofbasic characteristics 
of the lives of the poor; for example, they didn't know that health clinics regularly charged fees 
to the poor (Narayan and Nyamwaya 1996). 
Where there is interaction between those in power and the poor, it can be very lopsided. 
A 1995 participatory poverty assessment in Mexico found that custom dictated a patron-client 
relationship between politicians and the people, called clientilismo, in which political leaders 
provide services or favors in exchange for votes. This trading is the only way that the poor 
acquire land, housing, and urban infrastructure such as water and electricity. The system of 
strong vertical channels has led many to perceive a lack ofopportunities to act individually or as 
a collective group in their own interests and undermined their willingness to take any initiatives. 
The evidence cited above gives a flavor of the complexity and diversity in people's views 
about poverty. Their views on the causes of poverty and its cures can influence public efforts in 
ways that may be overlooked by conventional surveys. Their insights indicate actions with high 
benefits for poor people for relatively low financial costs. For example, access to healthcare 
emerges as a high priority for the poor in rural and urban communities in Zambia. Yet, the poor 
consistently complained that staff in hospitals and clinics were rude and arrogant to them (World ­
41 Salmen (1995). He goes on to say that in-depth listening to the poor would reveal whether getting out of poverty 
is more a problem oflack or absence of representation or lack ofmaterial resources, an issue of key importance in 
poverty reduction. 
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Bank, 1994). In response to the findings of the participatory poverty assessment, the World 
Bank's Social Fund supported some of the priorities identified by communities, and a health 
project now includes cost recovery conditions as identified in the assessment: drought-stricken 
areas are exempt from paying health fees, and the Ministry ofHealth has increased resources 
allocated to rural areas in an effort to empower and decrease the frustration of health workers 
(Robb 1999). The same participatory survey revealed a problem with respect to school fees, 
uniforms, books and materials for rural households. These expenditures typically occurred in the 
pre-harvest season when incomes are low and available cash is needed for emergency stocks of 
food to cover the period up to the harvest. This pointed to the need for stretching school 
expenses over the year or shifting them to another point in the year, policies which the Ministry 
ofEducation is now considering (Robb 1999). 
Thus, participatory surveys can enrich our understanding of the poor and lead to public 
action that is perceived by the poor to be ofbenefit to them. That said, these extensions­
especially vulnerability and powerlessness - probably do not change our view ofwho is poor 
significantly. This is difficult to establish in any precise way. As is the case with indicators of 
human development, we do not have household-level measures of vulnerability or powerlessness 
and so cannot distinguish the poor (in these dimensions) from the non-poor. Moreover, measures 
of exposure to risk could be very high for individuals with very large incomes. This is clearly 
not what people have in mind when they refer to vulnerability. 
Empirical evidence on the overlap between these measures of poverty and a consumption 
based one are scare. The one frequently cited study - Jodha (1988) - has been questioned by 
-Moore, Choudhary, and Singh (1998). Jodha claimed that the majority ofhouseholds who had 
.. 
experienced a decline in income by at least five percent between 1963-66 and 1982-84 in two 
villages in Rajasthan reported that they were better off according to several other criteria such as 
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lesser resort to "emergency" income-earning strategies. Moore et aI., point out that the 
provision ofmany public services had improved over this period. Piped drinking water had been 
provided for example. They also question the evidence on the decline in private income. Moore 
et aI., comment "There is no convincing evidence that the poor place a very high value on 
independence, respect, or personal autonomy if that is to be traded off against food when they are 
hungry" (Moore et aI, 1998, p. 17). 
Since vulnerability and powerlessness emerge clearly from participatory surveys, one 
way oftesting whether conventional measures ofpoverty coincide with measures based on 
vulnerability or powerlessness is to ask whether conventional surveys and participatory surveys 
identify the same people as poor. In Kenya, for example, we can compare the findings of the 
1995 participatory survey using "wealth ranking" with those of a 1992 National Welfare 
Monitoring Survey based on an established poverty line.42 Where cluster sampling was carried 
out carefully (and drought did not seriously affect the district in the intervening years), the 
estimates of poverty from the participatory survey end up being virtually identical to estimates 
from the national survey. In the district ofBomet, the two estimates were 64 percent 
(participatory) and 65 percent (national); in Busia, the respective numbers were both 68 percent, 
and in Nyamira, they were both 54 percent. 
As more points of comparison become available, the conclusion suggested by the Kenyan 
example will be confirmed or else modified. One interesting comparison comes from fieldwork 
in Lugazi, Uganda. The authors administered a questionnaire to 384 households, and conducted 
a series of participatory community meetings throughout Lugazi with attendance ranging from 
50 to 225 people. The purpose ofboth exercises was to ascertain willingness to pay for ­
improved water and sanitation service levels. The results are broadly similar. For example, the 
42 Narayan and Nyamwaya (1996). 
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household survey indicated that one third of households would connect to a piped water supply 
at the specified price, while the community meetings suggested that one quarter might do so. 
The authors argue that these differences are not significant from a policy perspective. They also 
note, however, that the two approaches resulted in samples with significantly different 
socioeconomic characteristics - despite "best practice" techniques in both cases different 
samples of individuals were consulted (Davis and Whittington, 1998). Their results both point 
the way and suggest the need for additional research to identify the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different approaches and how best to make use of conventional surveys and 
participatory approaches. 
Coping with Risk 
We have spoken of health and education for the poor as important components of a 
poverty-reducing strategy in their own right and as essential building blocks to help the poor 
increase their incomes. Underlying this we can identify other factors that provide the platform 
for reducing poverty. In particular, actions that reduce risk or provide insurance against risk 
expand the range of opportunities available to the poor and position them to take better 
advantage of strategies to reduce poverty whether it be with respect to health, education, or 
income-earning possibilities. How does recognizing the importance ofrisk influence poverty­
reducing strategies? 
Increasingly, we are realizing that even such victories as the poor can achieve in 
improving their lot, no matter how virtuously linked to increasingly better outcomes, ultimately 
suffer from excessive fragility. Risks associated with being poor may wipe out hard-won gains 
-

overnight. Indeed, as we have seen, one of the most common features alluded to in contemporary 
descriptions ofpoverty is risk. In many cases, risk prevents the poor from undertaking possibly 
high-return activities. The problem of risk has at least two dimensions, then: keeping the poor in 
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low-risk, low-return activities, and endangering what they already have. The usual remedies for 
risk - borrowing and insurance - are rarely available to the poor and their absence lies at the 
heart ofmany of the disadvantages the poor must face. 
A well-known study ofmoney lenders in Chambar, Pakistan in the early 1980s illustrates 
the problem in the credit market. Money lenders invest considerable time and effort in 
ascertaining the creditworthiness ofwould-be borrowers. Lacking collateral, the poor require 
more scrutiny than others. Even if an applicant successfully overcomes this hurdle (the rejection 
rate was around 50 percent), the money lender usually begins with a small loan to test the waters. 
The combination of high administrative cost and small loan leads inevitably to high interest 
rates. The average rate charged by money lenders in Chambar was 79 percent a year (Aleem, 
1993). At these rates, the poor are effectively excluded. Similarly, insurers lack a reliable means 
of assessing effort on the part of those seeking insurance especially in agricultural contexts and 
thus cannot identify the real cause of, say, a crop failure (Hazell et aI., 1986). 
The lack of credit and insurance bear heavily on the poor. For example, a study of rural 
households in south-western China for the period 1985-90 found that the loss of one year's 
income due to crop failure led on average to a 10 percent decline in consumption in the 
following year for the richest third of households. This is significant but manageable. In 
contrast, for the poorest tenth of households the average decline was a devastating 40 percent in 
the year following a crop failure (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999). Similarly, in the South Indian 
villages intensively surveyed over 10 years by ICRISAT the average coefficient ofvariation of 
household income was 40 percent; for farm profits it was over 125 percent (reported in Morduch, 
1995). ­
Poor households react to income volatility in two ways. They may adopt production 
plans or employment strategies to reduce their exposure to the risk of adverse income shocks 
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even if this entails lower average income. And, in addition to such efforts to smooth income, 
they may also try to smooth consumption by creating buffer stocks, withdrawing children from 
school, and developing informal insurance and credit arrangements. These efforts are both 
costly and inadequate. The cost arises because the poor face a bitter trade-off: they can accept 
risk that could lead to disastrous fluctuations in consumption, or minimize risk in ways that 
perpetuate poverty. And their efforts are inadequate because risks remain especially at the 
village, region, or national level against which the poor themselves are unable to insure. We 
illustrate these points briefly. 
With respect to costs, Morduch uses the ICRISAT data to show that households which 
are more vulnerable to income shocks devote a smaller share of their land (9 percent) to risky, 
high-yielding varieties compared with about 36 percent for households with better access to 
coping mechanisms (Morduch, 1990). And Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) show that when hit by a 
drop in income, poor households withdraw their children from school. They find that a 10 
percent decline in agricultural income across agricultural seasons leads to a fall in school 
attendance of about five days in a sample of six Indian villages. Thus, whether they reduce 
income or reduce schooling, these and other coping mechanisms, although providing some 
protection in the short run, limit their long·run prospects of escaping poverty. 
And with respect to inadequacy, informal mechanisms of insurance are unlikely to be 
able to cope with systemic risk. In four Muslim villages near Zaria in northern Nigeria, a 1988­
89 survey revealed the importance of informal credit transactions - over one half of the 
households had both borrowed and lent during the survey period, and only one tenth of 
-households had neither borrowed not lent. Loans between villages, however, are much less 
.­
prevalent than loans within villages. And yet more than half the variation (58 percent) in 
agricultural output in the region was caused by aggregate shocks that affected entire villages. No 
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matter how good the within-village insurance mechanisms, villagers were unable to protect 
themselves from one of the biggest sources of risk (Udry 1990 and 1994). 
To counteract the effects ofcrises on the poor, governments must provide safety nets to 
cushion the blows and keep the way open for the future. Their ability to do so is benefiting from 
two recent innovations. The information problems that so plague credit and insurance markets 
are being overcome through group screening and monitoring and through self-revelation of 
information. 
The costs ofcollecting information (see the Chambar example above) and enforcing 
repayment can be significantly reduced through group lending. Since groups ofpoor people may 
know quite a bit about each other and have many opportunities to interact and enforce their 
social expectations of each other's behavior, such groups may apply for joint loans and monitor 
each other to ensure repayment. Thus the information burden to the lender is significantly 
reduced and the poor pay less for the uncertainty lenders have about them. This idea, pioneered 
by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, has now spread in various forms to many countries. About ten 
million households worldwide are served by microfinance programs. Repayment rates are high ­
Grameen, for example, boasts a repayment rate above 95 percent. Interest rates are lower than 
those in the informal market, and more than 30 programs operate without any subsidy at all 
(Morduch, 1998a). 
As one might expect, not all programs are equally successful in all dimensions. Thus, the 
programs that have been most successful in reaching the poor remain far from financial 
sustainability. Grameen Bank, for example, has reached over two million borrowers, 94 percent 
ofwhom are women, by charging relatively low rates of interest - 20 percent a year. To operate ­
without any subsidies, however, Grameen would have to increase interest rates to 33 percent a 
year (Morduch, 1998a). Group-lending schemes have succeeded where others had failed, in 
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providing credit to the poor, but, as Morduch (I998c) notes a large number still face the problem 
of high operating costs. He goes on to propose two options. Focus on simple programs to reach 
the poor such as the simplified administrative procedures and 'minimalist credit' approach 
practiced by Bangladesh's Association for Social Advancement43 Alternatively, or jointly, 
governments and donors could undertake to subsidize the administrative costs ofprograms with 
significant poverty-focussed outreach. The relevant issue here is whether subsidies used for this 
purpose are a better way of helping the poor than subsidies used for other purposes and that calls 
for careful evaluation of the impact of alternative actions. 
As far as group-lending is concerned, the evidence is mixed. Some find evidence of 
substantial benefit. Pitt and Khandker (l998a) for example estimate that household consumption 
increases by 18 taka for every 100 taka lent to a women and by 11 taka for every 100 taka lent to 
a man. They also find evidence that access to credit improves the borrowing household's ability 
to smooth consumption across seasons (Pitt and Khandker, 1998b). However there is also 
evidence that significant rises in consumption arise primarily for moderately poor households 
who borrow beyond a threshold loan size (Zaman 1998).44 Using the same data as Khandker 
and Pitt and correcting for a possible error in their selectivity correction, Morduch (I998b) finds 
no increase in consumption but does find evidence of consumption smoothing. 
Even if the benefits ofgroup-lending are limited to consumption smoothing, this may 
lead to long-run gains that are not being captured in the surveys currently available. As we have 
noted above, the ability to smooth consumption is important not only for its immediate benefit 
but because it may help households pursue longer run strategies to escape poverty that might 
-
otherwise be considered too risky. The issue of interlinkages is also evident in another way. 
43 The tenn 'minimalist' credit, where only loans are provided, contrasts with the 'mtegrated credit' approach
 
practiced by BRAe in Bangladesh where some loans are supplemented with a package of extension services,
 
training and marketing support.
 
44 Zaman (1998) estimates this threshold as 10000 taka in cumulative loans.
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There is evidence that participation in micro-credit programs leads to an improvement in 
nutritional indicators and on children's schooling (K.handker 1998) and that access to credit has 
an 'empowering' effect on female borrowers giving them greater control of various aspects of 
their lives (Hashemi et al. 1996).45 
Savings offer another means of smoothing consumption. While many of the 
microfinance schemes have not focused on savings mobilization, some successful schemes are 
emerging. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) introduced a saving program called SIMPEDES in 
1986 that offers modest interest rates but allows withdrawals at any time. It also runs a lottery, 
with the chances ofwinning linked to the size ofdeposits. By 1988, over 4 million poor 
households were participating. This increased to 16 million by the end of 1996 (Morduch, 
1998a). As a result, BRI has access to a relatively cheap source of funds amounting to $3 billion 
in 1996, and households can accumulate assets as well as smooth consumption. 
A second important innovation is self-revelation of information. This has been used 
effectively in public works schemes. For example, in Chile, a large public works program in the 
wake of a major crisis in the 1980s succeeded in part because it set wages low enough to ensure 
that the most needy were the main participants.46 A World Bank project in Argentina in 1997 
offered low-wage work on community projects in poor areas, and more than half the participants 
were from the poorest 10 percent of the population.47 These and many other examples now 
provide a convincing argument that the basic approach has merit. Issues now revolve around 
how to keep administrative costs down and how to draw the balance between asset creation and 
insurance. Programs that offer guaranteed employment provide the greatest insurance but may 
not create the most productive assets. ­
45 Hashemi and Schuler (1996) develop an empowerment index made up of indicators such as female mobility, 
ownership and control over resources, decision-making over household purchases etc. They show that borrowing 
from Grameen and BRAe has a significant impact on empowerment controlling for a range of other factors. 
46 Wodd Bank (l998b). 
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Public insurance schemes may displace private efforts. That is why it is important to 
understand people's preferences for allocating time. For example, Datt and Ravallion (1994) 
investigate the opportunity costs to participants in rural public works projects in two Indian 
villages. In one, the public works participants mostly shift their time out ofbeing unemployed, 
so that their opportunity costs are low and their net benefits from the program are high. In the 
other village, public-works employment mostly replaces wage labor and own-farm work, leading 
to a substantially higher opportunity cost and lower net benefits. Similarly, Cox and Jimenez 
(1998) consider whether the motive for private transfers in Peru is altruism or exchange; this is 
important because such motivation can influence the effects ofpublic income transfers. Indeed, 
they find that social security benefits "crowd out" private transfers: receiving social security 
reduces the probability of receiving a private transfer by about six percent. The response is 
stronger in the Philippines, where Cox and Jimenez (1995) found that private transfers would be 
37 percent higher in the absence of retirement income. While these factors should be borne in 
mind when designing public action, there are two reasons to persevere with public schemes. 
First, as we see from these examples, the offset is not one-for-one. And second, insurance 
against village-wide or region-wide risks is unlikely to be accomplished through informal 
mechanisms. 
The East Asian crisis has served to underscore the importance of safety nets in a most 
dramatic and unfortunate way. Countries like Indonesia had neither the financial resources nor 
the administrative mechanisms to deal with the fall-out of the crisis. Actions being taken now 
will strengthen safety nets and social security throughout the region. But there is a lesson for 
•
macroeconomic policy here as well. The degree of risk in macroeconomic policy has to be 
managed in light of the ability to protect citizens in the advent of a crisis and the extent to which 
47 World Bank (1999), p. 126. 
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international action limits the likelihood of a crisis (Stiglitz, 1998a and 1998b). Absent an 
adequate domestic safety net and international restraints on investors, the risks in liberalizing 
financial markets and capital accounts are great. 
Many of the participatory poverty surveys reviewed earlier pointed to a concern with risk. 
Other evidence points to the costs ofvarious actions that the poor take to offset risk or deal with 
its consequences. At the same time, there is a growing but as yet incomplete body of evidence 
regarding public action to alleviate this dimension ofpoverty. While not all the evidence points 
in the same direction and further evaluations are clearly needed, experience suggests that a 
combination ofpublic works programs, group-lending schemes subsidized where necessary, and 
simple deposit schemes offer the poor at least some support in dealing with risk. 
From Isolation to Participation 
Recent theoretical contributions show how the median voter in a high-inequality, 
democratic society can achieve a more redistributive policy stance through the vote albeit at the 
cost of slower growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1994). What is wrong with this picture as a 
characterization of actual events in developing countries over the last 25 years? Apart from the 
inconclusive empirical evidence, the theory assumes that most countries were democracies so 
that the vote determined policy, and that, once determined, policy could be effectively 
implemented. Neither of these statements captures the reality of developing countries over the 
last quarter of the century. 
For a start, even as late as 1990, fewer than half the countries in the world were 
democracies. Moreover, inequality in many high-inequality countries is largely a consequence 
of the disproportionate share of income received by the richest decile. In the high-inequality • 
.. 
countries ofLatin America, the richest decile captures 40 percent of national income. Whether 
through the political process or outside it, this concentration of economic power must give a 
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small percentage of the population a tremendous capacity to influence the formulation ofpolicy 
and ifnot its formulation then its implementation. For example, Anand and Kanbur (1991) note 
that as the targeting of the Sri Lankan rice ration was improved, so it was allowed to be eroded 
by inflation with little or no protest. Those with the power to protest were not benefiting from 
the ration; so the erosion in its value actually freed up resources for other uses which might be to 
their benefit. 
The spread of democracy - the number of countries with electoral democracies increased 
from 76 in 1990 to 117 in 1995 - and the increasing commitment to respect civil and political 
rights - 140 countries have so far ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political- are 
opening the way to a larger say for the poor in policy-making. 
"Ownership" has been shown to be a key factor in the success or failure of structural 
adjustment loans. A study of 81 adjustment operations supported by the World Bank between 
1980 and 1992 developed a measure ofboITower ownership. The measure included the locus of 
the initiative for the program, the level of intellectual commitment ofkey policy-makers, the 
expression of political will by top leadership, and, of most interest for present purposes, efforts to 
build consensus. The last element assessed the extent to which the government had undertaken a 
broad public campaign to elicit support for the program. In the 16 cases when local ownership 
was considered to be very high, 15 of the operations were judged to be successful. And in the 17 
cases when local ownership was very low, only 3 operations were judged to be successful 
(Jayarajah and Branson, 1995). While these and similar results point to the importance of 
ownership, they do not tell us the extent to which the poor were consulted. 
-
The impact of the poor's voice is more apparent at the project level. Top-down solutions 
have often failed. Over the last decade, development practitioners have become increasingly 
aware that the poor have better knowledge of their situation and their needs, and can therefore 
47
 
contribute to the design ofpolicies and projects intended to better their lot. And once they have 
a say in design, they are also more committed to implementation. In direct opposition to the 
isolation the poor often endure, successful implementation calls for inclusion and active 
participation in a wide range of circumstances. 
Development practitioners have come to a consensus that participation by the int~nded 
beneficiaries improves project performance. Many examples now exist ofthe value of 
participation. In Indonesia, the Government and an aid organization, CARE, shifted their focus 
to community demand as the key selection criterion for water supply and sanitation projects, 
with control shifted to communities. Over the period 1979-1990 the combined cash 
contributions of CARE and the Indonesian government dropped from approximately 80 percent 
ofproject costs to about 30 percent. Communities had provided all cash contributions for 
physical construction for more than three-fourths of the projects, and most had successfully 
operated and maintained their systems. Many communities had also helped neighboring groups 
to develop their own systems (Narayan 1994). 
In addition to case studies, econometric evidence leads to the same conclusion. In a 
careful study of 121 rural water supply projects in 49 countries, Isham, Narayan, and Pritchett 
(1994) found that 7 out of every 10 projects succeeded when the intended beneficiaries took an 
active part in proj ect design, but that only 1 in 10 succeeded when they did not. Government 
support for a participatory approach greatly increased the likelihood ofparticipation. Case 
studies of some of these projects confirmed the importance ofparticipation. Phase I of the 
Aguthi Rural Water Supply Project in Kenya did not involve community members. The project 
...
ran into construction delays, cost over-runs, and disagreement over payment methods. To get the 
project back on track, local leaders and project staff organized stakeholder conferences. With 
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community involvement, Phase II of the project was completed on time and within budget 
(Narayan, 1994). 
The interactions between voice and other development outcomes and between risk and 
other development outcomes are perhaps less well understood and researched than the links 
between growth and inequality and between growth and human development that were discussed 
earlier. Nevertheless, the evidence available to date suggests that these are areas that warrant 
further attention.48 They have the potential to increase greatly the effectiveness of project and 
program implementation by giving the poor more say in matters, and, by reducing exposure to 
risk, they have the potential to provide the poor with the security to explore high-return activities 
that may have been outside their reach in the past but may also be their best hope for escaping 
poverty. Infonnation failures lie at the heart ofboth. 
IV. OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
How would Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree assess the evolution of thought over the last 
quarter of a century from the perspective ofhis investigation into poverty in the City ofYork at 
the turn of the century? We think he would have three reactions. First, surprise that the basic 
approach to measuring poverty used by him almost 100 years ago is still very much a feature of 
how we measure poverty today. Second, agreement that life expectancy, literacy, and morbidity 
are key aspects ofwellbeing and that the poor in the City ofYork suffered in all these 
dimensions. Indeed, he devotes a chapter to the relation ofpoverty to health. Rowntree states 
that "the death-rate is the best instrument for measuring the variations in the physical well-being 
-

ofthe people," and finds that "the mortality amongst the very poor is more than twice as high as 
amongst the best paid section of the working classes." Greater infant and child mortality as well 
48 See, for example, Rodrik (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). 
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as more general illness and physical under-development all afflicted the poor ofYork in 
Rowntree's time. 
His third reaction, toward the notion of giving the poor voice and providing them with 
safety nets, is nuanced. Though his object was "to state facts rather than to suggest remedies" he 
remarks that "the suffering may be all but voiceless," and also that even if all persons in poverty 
over 65 received old age pensions, it would only reduce poverty by about one percent". He 
criticizes the inadequacy of the work-houses and relief administration, and notes that the very 
poor often cannot afford to insure against illness -- but he makes only passing, vague mention of 
the prospect of the poor organizing politically or the State changing its power relations to the 
individual. In all, Rowntree exhibits a surprising modernity, stressing the importance of 
education (especially for women, acclaiming the benefits of capacity-building public service, and 
describing the interconnecting, cyclical nature of poverty, where outcomes become also causes. 
Looking back from our vantage point of today, how should we assess the evolution of 
thinking? While the different methods ofdefining and measuring poverty will inevitably 
identify different groups as poor, the evidence suggests that the differences may not be that great. 
Their real contribution is not to measurement, but to strategy; the way in which poverty is 
defined drives the strategy for dealing with it. One obvious aspect ofthis arises immediately 
from the broadening of the definition - more policy instruments become relevant to the task of 
reducing poverty. A less obvious aspect arises from the interactions among different aspects of 
poverty which, in tum, calls for a careful integration ofpolicies. 
When the focus was confined to income, the key interaction was between growth in the 
mean and changes in equality. As the definition expanded to include health status, literacy, and ­
so on, the key interaction became that between efforts to increase income and efforts to improve 
these other dimensions ofwellbeing. And when the definition was further extended to embrace 
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risk, vulnerability, and voice, then safety nets, access to credit, and participation emerged as 
critical to the poor's ability to take advantage of risky, poverty-reducing opportunities and to 
shape economic policy and programs to their benefit. 
And looking forward, what are the key outstanding areas in need of additional research? 
We close with two suggestions. First, additional research is still required to increase our 
understanding of the interactions identified in this review. We began by claiming that the 
appropriate package ofpolicies would have a greater impact than the sum of their parts because 
of these interactions. While we have presented evidence of this, more infonnation about the best 
combinations of policy for countries with different problems and different capacities would be of 
great value. In our view, this calls for careful, in depth country case studies to explore how 
different policy packages have or have not benefited the poor.49 And second, we have seen how 
infunnation failures and knowledge gaps may have undennined the access of the poor to credit 
and insurance and limited their role in the design and implementation ofpolicies and projects. 
Again, we gave examples ofwhere these problems seemed to have been overcome through 
development ofnew institutional arrangements but we lack a full assessment of these 
innovations. We suggest that the other priority, therefore, is the careful evaluation of these 
institutional innovations to find out what works and why.sO 
49 Taiwan provides good examples from the early work ofFei, Ranis, and Kuo (1979) to the more recent work of 
Chu (1995). Preliminary papers emerging from a research project on income distribution managed by Francois -
Bourguignon and Nora Lustig also illustrate the type of detailed analysis that can be undertaken at the country level. 
See Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999) for Brazil; and Bouillon, Legovini, and Lustig (1999) for Mexico. 
so Good examples to date include work on microfmance (Morduch, 1998b, for example) and on public employment 
schemes (Dan and Ravallion, 1994). Preliminary papers emerging from a research project on income distribution 
managed by Francois Bourguignon and Nora Lustig also illustrate the type ofdetailed analysis that can be 
undertaken. See Ferreira and Pues de Barros (1999) for Brazil; and Bouillon, Legovini, and Lustig (1998) for 
Mexico. 
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